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The Globalization Debates: Opening Up to New Spaces?

> An argument can be made that social science has been *too* geographical and not sufficiently historical, in the sense that geographical assumptions have trapped consideration of social and political-economic processes in geographical structures and containers that defy historical change.
>
> John Agnew (1995: 379)

> the preeminence of the 'global' in much of the literature and political rhetoric obfuscates, marginalises and silences an intense and ongoing sociospatial struggle in which the reconfiguration of spatial scales of governance takes a central position . . .
>
> Erik Swyngedouw (2000*a*: 64)

Introduction: rethinking the geographies of 'globalization'

Since the early 1970s, debates have raged throughout the social sciences concerning the process of 'globalization'—an essentially contested term whose meaning is as much a source of controversy today as it was nearly three decades ago, when systematic research first began on the topic. Contemporary research on globalization encompasses an immensely broad range of themes, from the new international division of labor, transnational corporations, technological change, forms of industrial organization, the financialization of capital, the consolidation of neoliberalism and urban-regional restructuring to transformations of state power, civil society, citizenship, democracy, public spheres, war, nationalism, politico-cultural identities, ideologies, consumption patterns, environmental problems, localities, and architectural forms.[1] Yet, despite this proliferation of research on the topic,

[1] The social-scientific literatures on globalization have grown immensely during the last two decades. For general overviews and extensive bibliographical guides, see, among other works,

little academic consensus has been established regarding the interpretation of even the most rudimentary elements of the globalization process—its appropriate conceptualization, its historical periodization, its underlying causal determinants, or its sociopolitical implications.

Nevertheless, within this whirlwind of opposing perspectives on globalization, numerous studies have devoted detailed attention to the question of how the *geographies* of social, political, and economic life are being transformed under contemporary conditions. Major strands of contemporary globalization research are permeated with explicitly geographical concepts—such as 'space-time compression', 'space-time distanciation', 'space of flows', 'space of places', 'deterritorialization', 'glocalization', the 'global–local nexus', the 'global–local interplay', 'supraterritoriality', 'diasporas', 'translocalities', and 'scapes', among many other terms. Meanwhile, contributors to the literatures on globalization commonly deploy a variety of geographical prefixes—such as 'sub-', 'supra-', and 'trans-'—in order to describe a range of social processes that appear to be operating either below, above, or beyond entrenched geopolitical boundaries. Globalization is, in short, an intrinsically geographical concept: the recognition that social relations are becoming increasingly interconnected on a global scale necessarily problematizes the spatial parameters of those relations, and therefore, the geographical context in which they occur. Under these circumstances, space cannot be conceived as a static, pregiven platform of social relations, but must be recognized as one of their constitutive, historically produced dimensions. As Harvey (1995: 5) has suggested, the recent explosion of research on globalization provides an occasion for a broader inquiry into the socially produced character of spatial forms under modern capitalism:

> One of the things that the adoption of the term 'globalization' now signals [...] is a profound geographical reorganization of capitalism, making many of the presumptions about the 'natural' geographical units within which capitalism's trajectory develops less and less meaningful (if they ever were). We are therefore faced with an historical opportunity to seize the nettle of capitalism's geography, to see the production of space as a constitutive moment within (as opposed to something derivatively constructed by) the dynamics of capital accumulation and class struggle.

In my view, the key methodological link between these major reorientations in the contemporary social sciences—the explosion of interest in globalization studies; and the recent 'reassertion of space in critical social theory'[2]—has been the pervasive questioning of the territorial nation-state as a preconstituted geographical unit of analysis for social research. As various authors have

Agnew and Corbridge 1994; Beck 2000; Guillén 2001; Held et al. 1999; Mittleman 1997; Scholte 2000; and Waters 1995. The recent special issues of *Economic Geography* (78/3, 2002), *International Sociology* (15/2, 2000), *International Social Science Journal* (June 1999), *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* (24/2, 2000) and *Review of International Political Economy* (4/3, 1997) also provide a useful sampling of major analytical and empirical perspectives.

[2] This phrase is the subtitle of Soja's (1989) *Postmodern Geographies*.

recently argued, significant strands of twentieth-century social science have been locked into a state-centric epistemological framework in which national states are viewed as relatively fixed, self-enclosed geographical containers of social, economic, political, and cultural relations (Agnew 1994; Taylor 1996). However, to the extent that the current round of global restructuring has significantly reconfigured, and at least partially undermined, the container-like qualities of national states, this inherited model of territorially self-enclosed, nationally organized societies, economies, or cultures has become deeply problematic. Thus arises the need for new modes of analysis that do not naturalize national state territoriality and its associated, Cartesian image of space as a static block, platform, or container. Particularly since the early 1980s, globalization researchers have constructed a variety of heterodox, interdisciplinary, and even postdisciplinary methodologies that have begun to challenge the 'iron grip of the nation-state on the social imagination' (Taylor 1996: 1923). This wide-ranging effort to transcend state-centric epistemologies arguably represents one of the unifying theoretical agendas underlying contemporary research on globalization.

Against the background of the apparent spatial turn in contemporary globalization studies, this chapter examines critically the efforts of globalization researchers to transcend state-centric modes of social analysis. This goal is, in practice, considerably more difficult to accomplish than is usually recognized, for it entails much more than an acknowledgement that transnational or global processes are gaining significance. On the contrary, as I suggest below, the overcoming of state-centrism requires a comprehensive reconceptualization of entrenched understandings of space as a fixed, pregiven container or platform for social relations. Despite the persistent efforts of critical human geographers in recent decades to unsettle such assumptions, the conception of space as a realm of stasis, fixity, and stability—which contains but is not substantively modified by social action—is still surprisingly pervasive throughout the social sciences (Massey 1994).[3] Even within contemporary globalization studies, in which debates on the problematic of social spatiality have proliferated in recent decades, many analyses are still grounded upon atemporal geographical assumptions that are derived from an increasingly obsolete, nation state-centric configuration of capitalist development. Thus, one of the central intellectual barriers to a more adequate understanding of contemporary global transformations is that we currently lack appropriately *historical* and *dynamic* conceptualizations of social space that are attuned to the possibility of systemic transformations within established political-economic geographies.

The challenges of transcending state-centric modes of analysis do not end here. Even when static, territorialist models of social spatiality are effectively overcome, the question of how more adequately to conceptualize the spatial-

[3] Henri Lefebvre's *The Production of Space* (1991) represents one of the most trenchant critiques of this 'timeless' conception of space.

ities of globalization remains thoroughly contentious. Those globalization researchers who have successfully transcended such state-centric geographical assumptions have generally done so by asserting that national state territoriality and even geography itself are currently shrinking, contracting, or dissolving due to alleged processes of 'deterritorialization'. A break with state-centrism is thus secured through the conceptual negation of the national state and, more generally, of the territorial dimensions of social life. I shall argue, however, that this methodological strategy sidesteps the crucially important task of analyzing the ongoing reterritorialization and rescaling of political-economic relations under contemporary capitalism. Consequently, within most standard accounts of deterritorialization, the goal of overcoming state-centrism is accomplished on the basis of a seriously one-sided depiction of currently emergent sociospatial forms.

In contrast to these positions, this chapter provides an initial sketch of the alternative conceptualization of contemporary sociospatial restructuring that will be developed at length in this book. At the heart of this argument is the contention that capitalism is currently experiencing (*a*) the transcendence of the nationalized sociospatial arrangements that prevailed throughout much of the twentieth century; and, concomitantly, (*b*) the production of new, rescaled sociospatial configurations that cannot effectively be described on the basis of purely territorialist, nationally scaled models. An essential, if apparently paradoxical, corollary of this thesis is the claim that state-centric mappings of social spatiality severely limit our understanding of the national state's own major role as a site, medium, and agent of contemporary global restructuring. Therefore, the effort to transcend state-centric modes of analysis does not entail a denial of the national state's continued relevance as a major locus of political-economic regulation. What such a project requires, rather, is a reconceptualization of how the geographies of state space are being transformed at various geographical scales under contemporary geoeconomic conditions. Such a reconceptualization is one of the key goals to be pursued in subsequent chapters of this book.

In the next section, I summarize the conceptualization of sociospatial restructuring under capitalism that grounds my analysis of the globalization debates. On this basis, I develop an interpretation of the epistemology of state-centrism, and I indicate various ways in which the contemporary round of global restructuring has undermined state-centric modes of analysis. Then, through a critical analysis of two major strands of globalization research—labeled, respectively, 'global territorialist' approaches and 'deterritorialization' approaches—I sketch an alternative interpretation of contemporary global restructuring as a contradictory process of reterritorialization and rescaling in which state institutions play crucial mediating and facilitating roles. A concluding section outlines various key methodological challenges for contemporary studies of global restructuring that will be explored in the remainder of this book.

Capitalist development and the creative destruction of sociospatial configurations

'Globalization' is a thoroughly contested term. Some researchers focus upon shifts in the world economy such as the dissolution of the Bretton Woods monetary regime in the early 1970s, the enhanced importance of transnational corporations, the deregulation of finance capital, the liberalization of trade and investment flows, the massive expansion of foreign direct investment, the intensified deployment of information technologies, and the reduction in the cost and time of long-distance transport. For some scholars, globalization is associated with a variety of threats to, or transformations of, established forms of national state power. Others emphasize newly emergent forms of collective identity, political mobilization, and diaspora, often mediated through new information technologies, that appear to have unsettled the principle of nationality as a locus of everyday social relations. And finally, some authors have suggested that globalization has entailed the consolidation of worldwide forms of popular consciousness and political authority that open up new possibilities for human emancipation.[4]

Clearly, the relative merits of these and other approaches to globalization hinge upon their relative usefulness as tools of analysis with reference to particular research questions and political concerns. Yet, regardless of which specific social, political, economic, or cultural processes are foregrounded, it is crucial to avoid the widespread tendency to treat globalization as a single, all-encompassing mega-trend, causal force, or end-state (Dicken, Tickell, and Peck 1997). The notion of globalization is first and foremost a descriptive category denoting, at the most general level, the spatial extension of social interdependencies on a worldwide scale (Rosenberg 2000: 2).[5] To the extent that worldwide social interdependencies are being enhanced, this development must be interpreted as the aggregate consequence of a variety of interrelated tendencies rather than being viewed as the expression of a single, internally coherent causal mechanism. From this perspective, an adequate analysis of globalization must differentiate the multifaceted causal *processes* that have underpinned this worldwide extension of social relations, while simultaneously attempting to trace the variegated, uneven *effects* of such processes in different political-economic contexts (Yeung 2002). In other words, 'Globalisation as an outcome cannot be explained simply by invoking globalisation as

[4] On the economic dimensions of globalization see, for instance, K. Cox 1997; Knox and Agnew 1995; Boyer and Drache 1996; Daniels and Lever 1996; Dicken 1998; Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995; and Wade 1996. On the political dimensions of globalization, see Cerny 1995; R. Cox 1987; Jessop 2002; Mann 1997; McMichael 1996; and Strange 1996. On globalization and the transformation of cultural forms and collective identities, see Appadurai 1996; Featherstone 1990; Magnusson 1996; Marden 1997; and Scholte 1996. On the emergence of worldwide forms of popular consciousness, see Robertson 1992; Shaw 2000; and Albrow 1996.

[5] Versions of this definition are developed by Giddens 1990; Held 1995; and McGrew 1992.

a process tending towards that outcome' (Rosenberg 2000: 2).[6] Considerable methodological reflexivity is therefore required in order to circumvent some of the many 'chaotic' presuppositions and explanations that underpin mainstream accounts of contemporary globalization (Jessop 1999*c*).[7]

For present purposes, my concern is to explore the implications of the current round of global restructuring for the changing geographical organization of capitalism. Thus, before examining more closely the geographical contours of the contemporary globalization debate, it is necessary first to explicate some of the key theoretical assumptions upon which my own understanding of social spatiality and sociospatial restructuring is grounded. The starting point for this analysis is a *processual* conceptualization of sociospatial forms under modern capitalism (Lefebvre 1991). In this view, space is not opposed to time and historicity, but must be viewed as a co-constitutive, dialectically inseparable moment of the latter. Thus, while concepts such as space, territory, geography, place, and scale are generally used to connote fixed objects, pregiven platforms or static things, I shall use them throughout this book as shorthand labels for more precise, if also more stylistically cumbersome, terminological formulations—such as spatialization processes, territorialization processes, geography-making, place-making, and scaling. In other words, all aspects of social space under modern capitalism must be understood as presuppositions, arenas and outcomes of dynamic processes of continual social contestation and transformation. Such a conceptualization entails the replacement of traditional Cartesian notions of 'space-as-thing' or 'space-as-platform' with a dialectical, social-constructionist notion of 'space-as-process'. For the sake of stylistic convenience, I shall continue to use standard terms such as space, territory, place, and scale—but it must be emphasized that these labels connote ongoing *processes* of spatialization, territorialization, place-making, and scaling rather than fixed, pregiven, or static entities. Over two decades ago, Soja (1980) summarized this essential methodological point with the memorable phrase, 'the sociospatial dialectic'. A directly analogous idea is also at the heart of Lefebvre's (1991) now well-known concept of the 'production of space'.

[6] In addition to the danger of conflating causes and effects in studies of globalization, it is equally important to recognize the politically contested character of popular and academic discourse on this theme. Notions of globalization have been deployed strategically by diverse actors and organizations—including transnational corporations, state institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and oppositional social movements—in order to pursue specific political and ideological agendas. This discursive, political, and strategic aspect of globalization has played a hugely powerful role in influencing popular understandings of contemporary capitalism, whether as a means to naturalize neoliberal policy prescriptions, to promote state institutional restructuring, to reorient corporate strategies, to reinterpret social identities, or to rally anticapitalist resistance (Kelly 1999; Kipfer and Keil 1995; Bourdieu 1996).

[7] In an effort to circumvent such confusions, the remainder of this chapter adopts the terminology of 'global restructuring' rather than referring simply to 'globalization'. In contrast to the notion of globalization, which implies the existence of a singular, unified mega-trend, the notion of restructuring implies an uneven, multifaceted, polymorphic, and open-ended process of change (Soja 1989). However, when discussing the work of authors who deploy the notion of globalization, I shall continue to use this generic term.

A foundational question for any study of the production of space under capitalism is how such processes of spatialization, territorialization, place-making, scaling, and so forth mold and continually reshape the geographical landscape.[8] In the present context, I shall build upon Harvey's (1985, 1982) conceptualization of the production of spatial configuration under capitalism as a basis for examining the distinctively geographical parameters of contemporary forms of global restructuring.

According to Harvey (1985), capitalism is under the impulsion to eliminate all geographical barriers to the accumulation process by seeking out cheaper raw materials, fresh sources of labor-power, new markets for its products, and new investment opportunities. This deterritorializing, expansionary tendency within capitalism was clearly recognized by Marx, who famously described capital's globalizing dynamic as a drive to 'annihilate space by time' and analyzed the world market as its historical product and its geographical expression (Marx 1973 [1857]: 539). In Marx's (1973: 408) famous formulation in the *Grundrisse*, 'the tendency to create the world market is inherent to the concept of capital itself. Every limit appears as a barrier to be overcome.' Thus, for Harvey, as for Marx, capital is oriented simultaneously towards temporal acceleration (the continual acceleration of turnover times) and spatial expansion (the overcoming of geographical barriers to the process of accumulation). More recently, Harvey (1989*c*) has referred to these spatio-temporal tendencies within the capital relation as a process of 'time-space compression'. Insofar as they eliminate historically specific territorial barriers to accumulation, these tendencies may be said to embody capital's moment of *deterritorialization*.

At the same time, Harvey insists that the impulsion to reduce the socially necessary turnover time of capital and to expand its spatial orbit necessarily hinges upon the production of relatively fixed and immobile sociospatial configurations. Indeed, according to Harvey, it is only through the production of historically specific socio-geographical infrastructures—composed, for instance, of urban built environments, industrial agglomerations, regional production complexes, systems of collective consumption, large-scale transportation networks, long-distance communications grids, and state regulatory institutions—that processes of time-space compression can unfold. In this sense, each moment of deterritorialization hinges upon an equally essential moment of *reterritorialization* in which relatively fixed and immobile spatial arrangements are established or modified as a basis for extending and accelerating capital's orbit. As Harvey (1985: 149) explains, 'the ability to overcome space is predicated on the production of space'. From this perspective, the historical evolution of capitalism has entailed the increasing replacement of inherited precapitalist landscapes with specifically capitalist sociospatial

[8] This question has long preoccupied critical sociospatial theorists, particularly in the fields of urban and regional studies and geographical political economy. Detailed overviews of, and contributions to, these discussions include Benko and Strohmayer 1991; Gottdiener 1985; Hudson 2001; Katznelson 1992; Soja 2000, 1989; and Storper and Walker 1989.

configurations—a 'second nature' of socially produced geographical infrastructures that are suited to the operations of capital under particular conditions (Harvey 1989*b*: 191). In a capitalist context, these socially produced geographical landscapes—to which I shall refer generically as 'capitalist sociospatial configurations'—represent an essential force of production: while they serve as presuppositions, arenas, and outcomes of particular types of social activities, they also play essential roles in providing the logistical foundations for the process of capital circulation as a whole (Swyngedouw 1992*b*). Each framework of capitalist sociospatial organization is closely intertwined with historically specific patterns of uneven development insofar as it entails the systemic privileging of some locations, places, territories, and scales and the marginalization or exclusion of others.

Harvey refers to these historically specific sociospatial configurations, and their associated forms of uneven development, as capital's 'spatial fix'—a 'tendency towards [. . .] a structured coherence to production and consumption within a given space' (Harvey 1985: 146). By providing a relatively fixed and immobile basis upon which capital's circulation process can be accelerated, extended, and intensified, each spatial fix entails 'the conversion of temporal into spatial restraints to accumulation' (Harvey 1982: 416). However, Harvey also insists that no spatial fix can ever permanently resolve the endemic crisis-tendencies that pervade capitalism. Consequently, each sociospatial configuration is merely temporary, a chronically unstable 'dynamic equilibrium' (Harvey 1985: 136) within a broader, chaotic see-saw of perpetual sociospatial change. On this basis, Harvey (1985: 150) interprets the historical geography of capitalism as a process of continual restructuring in which sociospatial configurations are incessantly created, destroyed, and reconstituted anew:

> Capitalist development must negotiate a knife-edge between preserving the values of past commitments made at a particular place and time, or devaluing them to open up fresh room for accumulation. Capitalism perpetually strives, therefore, to create a social and physical landscape in its own image and requisite to its own needs at a particular point in time, only just as certainly to undermine, disrupt and even destroy that landscape at a later point in time. The inner contradictions of capitalism are expressed through the restless formation and re-formation of geographical landscapes. This is the tune to which the historical geography of capitalism must dance without cease.

For Harvey, then, the endemic tension between fixity and motion—'between the rising power to overcome space and the immobile spatial structures required for such a purpose' (Harvey 1985: 150)—provides the analytical key to the investigation of processes of sociospatial restructuring under capitalism. Capitalist sociospatial configurations are produced as historically specific geographical preconditions for capital's globalizing dynamism, only to be eventually torn down, reconfigured, and reterritorialized during recurrent waves of systemic crisis, disinvestment, and institutional reorganization. Through this tumultuous process of creative destruction, inherited geographical landscapes, institu-

tional arrangements, and forms of uneven development are reshaped quite dramatically, as major factions of capital strive to amortize the full value of existing spatial configurations, to 'wash away the dead weight of past investments' and to wrest open new possibilities for accumulation (Harvey 1989*b*: 192–4).

Harvey's approach to the creative destruction of sociospatial configurations under capitalism has proven highly influential during the last two decades in the fields of geographical political economy, urban and regional studies, and sociospatial theory. My goal here is to underscore its implications for interpreting the diverse restructuring processes that are generally subsumed under the rubric of 'globalization'. As indicated, globalization is a multifaceted concept that refers, at core, to the extension of spatial interdependencies on a worldwide scale. While it would clearly be problematic to reduce this tendency to any single causal mechanism, Harvey's conceptualization of capitalist sociospatial configurations provides a useful analytical basis on which to interpret some of its core spatio-temporal dynamics. From this perspective, the contemporary round of global restructuring can be interpreted as the most recent historical expression of the *longue durée* dynamic of deterritorialization, reterritorialization, and uneven geographical development that has underpinned the production of capitalist spatiality throughout the modern era (Harvey 1995). As in previous rounds of crisis-induced sociospatial restructuring, contemporary global shifts have entailed a multifaceted, dialectical process through which: (*a*) the movement of commodities, capital, and people through geographical space has been expanded and accelerated; (*b*) relatively fixed and immobile socio-territorial infrastructures have been produced or transformed in order to enable such expanded, accelerated movement; and (*c*) inherited patterns of uneven geographical development have been systematically reworked at various spatial scales. Therefore, much like earlier periods of creative destruction under capitalism, the contemporary round of global restructuring has been grounded upon a multiscalar, dialectical interplay between deterritorializing and reterritorializing tendencies.

I shall develop this conceptualization of contemporary global restructuring in more detail below, through a critical analysis of major strands of the globalization literature. At this juncture, six initial implications of the theorization outlined above deserve special emphasis.

1. Contemporary forms of global restructuring represent conflictual, uneven, and dialectical processes of sociospatial change rather than a static end-state or a terminal condition.
2. Contemporary processes of global restructuring are both spatial (based upon the reconfiguration of inherited sociospatial configurations) and temporal (based upon the acceleration of capital's socially average turnover time).
3. Contemporary processes of global restructuring are unfolding simultaneously upon multiple, intertwined geographical scales—not only within

global space, but also through the production and reconfiguration of diverse subglobal spaces such as supranational blocs, national states, regions, cities, localities, and neighborhoods.

4. These multiscalar shifts have not entailed a total obliteration of inherited sociospatial configurations but rather their functional, institutional, and geographical redefinition: they are thus premised upon a complex mix of continuity and change.
5. Contemporary processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization stem from a diverse range of political-economic causes—including, among others, the reorganization of corporate accumulation strategies, the consolidation of neoliberalism, financial deregulation, accelerated technological change, new population movements, geopolitical shifts, and transformations of the global labor force—rather than from a single mega-trend (Harvey 1995; Jessop 1999*c*). Their consequences are equally variegated in different political-economic contexts.
6. Finally, and most crucially, national territorial states must be viewed as essential geographical arenas and agents of contemporary forms of global restructuring rather than as the passive or helpless victims of these processes.

The latter point is particularly essential to my argument here. While numerous authors have usefully underscored the activist role of national states in facilitating the contemporary round of geoeconomic integration,[9] I am concerned in this book to explore the *territorializing* operations of state institutions in relation to capital at both national and subnational spatial scales. For, much like urban-regional agglomerations, national states have long operated as relatively fixed and immobile forms of (re)territorialization for successive rounds of time-space compression, particularly since the second industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century (Lefebvre 1978; Brenner 1998*a*). With the consolidation of national-developmentalist political regimes during that period, national states became ever more central to the promotion, regulation, and financing of capitalist expansion—above all through their role in the construction of large-scale geographical infrastructures for industrial production, collective consumption and long-distance market exchange, transportation, and communication (see Ch. 3). From this perspective, late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century forms of geoeconomic integration entailed the consolidation of the national state's role as a territorialized scaffolding for accelerated capital circulation and as an institutional interface between subnational and supranational scales. Throughout this period, processes of globalization and (national) territorialization proceeded in tandem, mutually reinforcing one another in powerful ways (Goswami 2004).

[9] See e.g. Helleiner 1994; Panitch 1994; Radice 1999; Sassen 1996; Scholte 1997; Sites 2003; and Weiss 1998.

I shall argue below that, under contemporary geoeconomic conditions, national states continue to operate as key forms of territorialization for the social relations of capitalism, but that the *scalar* geographies of this state-organized territorialization process have been fundamentally reconfigured. This development has systematically undermined inherited, state-centric conceptions of political-economic space. But what sorts of geographical assumptions do such state-centric visions entail? It is to this question that I now turn.

Hidden geographies and the epistemology of state-centrism

> As a youthful philatelist in the mid-twentieth century, I sorted my stamps by political jurisdiction. I directed attention to the national forms—technical and symbolic—through which both intranational and international communication took place [. . .] Much social science sorted social relations in the same way, simply assuming the coincidence of social boundaries with state boundaries and that social action occurred primarily within, and secondarily across, these divisions. Social relations were represented by the national societies that were assumed to frame them. Just as I collected the various ephemera of national postal systems, social scientists collected distinctive national social forms.
>
> Martin Shaw (2000: 68)

> Embedded statism contains the remarkable geographical assumption that all the important human social activities share exactly the same spaces. This spatial congruence can be stated simply: the 'society' which sociologists study, the 'economy' which economists study, and the 'polity' which political scientists study all share a common geographical boundary, that of the state. However abstract the social theory, it is national societies which are described; however quantitative the economic models, it is national economies which are depicted; and however behavioral the political science, it is national governance at issue.
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> Peter Taylor (2000: 8)

Agnew (1995) has questioned whether recent discussions of space, territory, and place in the social sciences amount to a fully-fledged 'sociospatial turn'. Insofar as social science has always been permeated by historically specific geographical assumptions, Agnew argues, the notion of a 'resurgence' or 'reassertion' of spatial influences makes little sense.[10] Although I believe that

[10] The main target of Agnew's critique is apparently Soja's *Postmodern Geographies* (1989), which argues for a domination of 'historicism' over spatial considerations in much of postwar social science. Soja's more recent work (1996) preserves his emphasis on the 'reassertion of space in social theory' while recognizing the existence of geographical assumptions even in historicist modes of analysis.

contemporary studies of globalization have indeed confronted the problematic of social spatiality with a renewed intensity, this section provides support for Agnew's argument. As the above-quoted statements by Shaw and Taylor indicate, state-centric approaches do not exclude geographical considerations to constitute a despatialized social science; on the contrary, a distinctively ahistorical spatial ontology lies at their very heart.

In my view, state-centrism can be defined most precisely in terms of its three most essential, if usually implicit, geographical assumptions: (*a*) the conception of space as a static platform of social action that is not itself constituted or modified socially; (*b*) the assumption that all social relations are organized within territorially self-enclosed spatial containers; and (*c*) the assumption that all social relations are organized at a national scale or are undergoing a process of nationalization.[11] The first assumption results in a *spatial fetishism* in which space is seen as being timeless, and therefore immune to historical change. The second assumption results in a *methodological territorialism* in which territoriality—the principle of spatial enclosure—is treated as the necessary spatial form for social relations. The third assumption generates a *methodological nationalism* in which the national scale is treated as the ontologically primary locus of social relations. Taken together, these assumptions generate an internalist model of societal development in which national territoriality is presumed to operate as a static, fixed, and timeless container of historicity (Fig. 2.1). While all three of these assumptions have pervaded mainstream social science, any given mode of analysis may be said to be state-centric, in the terms proposed here, when the assumption of spatial fetishism is linked either to methodological territorialism or methodological nationalism.

Defined in this manner, a state-centric epistemology has pervaded the modern social sciences since their inception during the late nineteenth

Spatial fetishism	Conception of social space as timeless and static, and thus as immune to the possibility of historical change
Methodological territorialism	Assumption that all social relations are organized within self-enclosed, discretely bounded territorial containers
Methodological nationalism	Assumption that all social relations are organized at a national scale or are becoming nationalized

Fig. 2.1. The epistemology of state-centrism: three key geographical assumptions

[11] The term 'state-centric' has a different meaning in the literature on 'bringing the state back in', in which state-centered approaches are contrasted to society-centered approaches. In these discussions, state-centered theories emphasize the autonomous institutional power of the state over and against societal or class-based forces. For a useful critical overview of this literature, see Jessop (1990*a*: 278–306). In contrast to this literature, the notion of state-centrism developed here refers to a more generalized sociospatial ontology that has been implicit within a wide range of research paradigms throughout the social sciences.

century. Not surprisingly, political science has been the most explicitly state-centric among the social sciences. States have been viewed as politically sovereign and economically self-propelled entities, with national state territoriality understood as the basic reference point in terms of which all subnational and supranational political-economic processes are to be classified. On this basis, the (national) state has been viewed as the container of (national) society, while the interstate system has been mapped in terms of a distinction between 'domestic' politics and 'foreign' relations in which national state boundaries are said to separate 'inside' from 'outside' (Agnew 1994; R. B. J. Walker 1993). Crucially, however, the above definition extends the problematic of state-centrism well beyond those fields of inquiry that are focused directly upon state operations and political life to various modes of anthropological, sociological, and economic analysis in which the concept of the state may not even be explicitly deployed. Indeed, as defined above, a state-centric epistemology has arguably underpinned significant strands of sociology (due to its focus on nationally configured societies and communities), anthropology (due to its focus on bounded, territorialized cultures), and macro-economics (due its focus on purportedly self-contained, self-propelled national economies).

First, as it has traditionally been deployed, the concept of society has implied that the boundaries of social relations are spatially congruent with those of the national state (Giddens 1984; Urry 2000). Even when the notion of society has not been defined explicitly in terms of the state's national boundaries, it has still been widely understood as a territorially self-enclosed entity, essentially as a subnational replication of the state-defined society, its geographical analog on a smaller spatial scale (Agnew 1993; Häkli 2001; Pletsch 1981). Although anthropology avoided this explicit form of state-centrism prior to the advent of area studies during the postwar era, throughout its history most of the discipline has still presupposed a territorialized concept of culture as a localized, spatially fixed community (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Malkki 1992). Finally, from Smith and Ricardo to List, Keynes, and the contemporary monetarists, macro-economic theory has long conceived the territorialized national economy as its most elemental unit of analysis, the preconstituted container of production, exchange, and consumption that is likewise said to be spatially coextensive with the state's territorial boundaries (Radice 1984). While trade theory has always contained an explicitly international dimension, this too has remained markedly state-centric insofar as national states have been viewed as the primary geographical blocks between which the factors of production are moved and in terms of which comparative advantage is measured (Taylor 1996: 1925).[12]

[12] As Taylor (1996: 1922–3) notes, until relatively recently even the discipline of human geography has replicated this territorialized, state-centric conceptual orientation, either with reference to the urban scale (urban ecology and the study of urban systems), the national scale (political geography), or the transnational scale (geopolitics). Due to its anarchist, anti-statist roots in the work of theorists such as Elisée Reclus and Peter Kropotkin, classical regional geography provides an

This unhistorical conception of spatiality can be usefully characterized as a *state*-centric epistemology because its widespread intellectual plausibility has been premised upon a naturalization of the modern state's specifically national/territorial form. Among the most rudimentary features of territoriality in social life is its role as a strategy grounded upon the parcelization and enclosure of space (Sack 1986). However, in the modern interstate system, territoriality has assumed a historically specific geographical significance. With the dissolution of feudal hierarchies in late medieval Europe, political space came to be organized in terms of exclusive state control over self-enclosed territorial domains (Spruyt 1994). This development was institutionalized in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which recognized the existence of an interstate system composed of contiguous, bounded territories ruled by sovereign national states committed to the principle of noninterference in each other's internal affairs. The consequence of this transformation has been the long-term enclosure of political, economic, and military power within a global grid of mutually exclusive yet geographically contiguous national state territories. This bundling of territoriality to state sovereignty is arguably the essential characteristic of the modern interstate system (Gottmann 1983; Ruggie 1993; R. B. J. Walker 1993). In this system, political authority is grounded upon: (*a*) the *territorialization* of state power, in which each state attempts to exercise exclusive sovereignty over a delineated, self-enclosed national space; and (*b*) the *globalization* of the territorial state form, in which the entire globe is progressively subdivided among contiguous, nonoverlapping national state territories.

Clearly, the notion of territoriality is a polysemic category and not all its meanings refer to this statist global and national geography. However, since the late nineteenth century, the social sciences have come to presuppose a territorialist, nationalized image of social space derived from the form of territory-sovereignty nexus that has been produced and continually reinscribed at a national scale within the modern interstate system. By the mid-twentieth century, each of the conceptual building blocks of the modern social sciences—in particular, the notions of state, society, economy, culture, and community—had come to presuppose this simultaneous territorialization and nationalization of social relations within a parcelized, fixed, and essentially timeless geographical space. The resultant state-centric epistemology entailed the transposition of the historically unique territorial and scalar configuration of the modern interstate system into a generalized model of sociospatial organization, whether with reference to political, societal, economic, or cultural processes. Within this framework, sociohistorical change is said to occur

exception to this tendency insofar as regions were viewed as ecologically delimited, contextually specific environments rather than as territorial subunits of the state. Likewise, in major strands of the discipline of history, an idiographic notion of space-as-context provided an important alternative to the conception of space-as-container that dominated the other, more nomothetically oriented social sciences.

within the fixed territorial boundaries of a national state, society, culture, or economy rather than through the transformation of those boundaries, their scalar contours and the political-economic practices they putatively enclose. State-centric modes of analysis acquired a doxic, taken-for-granted character during the course of the twentieth century, as their 'spatial premises enter[ed] into the realm of ''common sense'' where interrogation is deemed both unnecessary and quite uncalled for' (Taylor 2000: 6).[13]

Particularly from an early twenty-first century vantage point, it is crucial to recognize that the epistemology of state-centrism was not merely a fantasy or an ideological projection. Indeed, its widespread intellectual plausibility was derived from the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historical-geographical context in which the social sciences first emerged, during which the territorial state's role in 'encaging' socioeconomic and politico-cultural relations within its boundaries dramatically intensified (Mann 1993; Maier 2000). Although the lineages of this statist developmental configuration can be traced to the late eighteenth century, when England's territorial economy superseded the city-centered economy of Amsterdam, it was above all during the twentieth century that the interstate system came to operate like 'a vortex sucking in social relations to mould them through its territoriality' (Taylor 1994: 152; see also Braudel 1984). Britain's attempt to institutionalize a self-regulating world market during the nineteenth century by combining imperialist expansion with trade liberalization eventually resulted in a countervailing 'great transformation' in which increasingly autarkic, protectionist regulatory frameworks were constructed throughout western Europe and North America (Polanyi 1957). Under these conditions, as McMichael (1987: 223) notes, the 'world market was internalized within the nation-state, which [. . .] became the locus of reproduction of capital' (quoted in Radice 1998: 267). The nationally organized forms of state regulation that were subsequently consolidated served as the institutional basis for 'organized capitalism', the

[13] This is not the place to analyze the complex institutional histories through which this state-centric epistemology gradually became hegemonic as a mode of social-scientific inquiry, particularly in the postwar USA but also in Europe, the Soviet Union, and much of the Third World. My concern here is less to examine the institutional consolidation of state-centrism than to characterize analytically its main geographical presuppositions. For accounts of the institutional histories of state-centrism, see Pletsch 1981; Palat 1996; and Wallerstein 1996.

In this context, it is also crucial to note that these state-centric tendencies in the classical social sciences coexisted uneasily with an opposing, if largely subterranean, 'globalist' strand of theory and research. This globalist mode of analysis was elaborated during the 19th and early 20th centuries above all in Marx's theory of capital accumulation and in the theories of imperialism developed by Lenin, Luxemburg, and Bukharin. Although major strands of Marxian social theory were also eventually infused with state-centric assumptions (such as the notion that the national scale was the main strategic locus of class struggle), this intellectual tradition was arguably the most important alternative to state-centrism within classical sociological discourse. Following World War II, various non-Marxist alternatives to state-centrism also emerged, including the *Annales* school of historiography and the figurational sociology of Norbert Elias. In addition to these strands of research, Taylor (1996: 1918–19) detects various late 19th-century contextualist alternatives to state-centric conceptions of space, such as idiographic approaches to historiography and Marshallian-inspired economic analyses focused on the problem of urban-regional agglomeration.

global regime of accumulation that prevailed from the early twentieth century until the early 1970s (Lash and Urry 1987). During the post-World War II period, under the rubric of US global hegemony, Cold War geopolitical divisions, the Bretton Woods global monetary regime, and the Non-Aligned Movement of newly decolonized states, national-developmentalist practices and ideologies were further consolidated throughout the world system, grounded upon the notion that each national state would guide its own national society and economy through a linear, internally defined, and self-propelled process of modernization (McMichael 1996). Within this nationalized but worldwide political geography, 'The organizing world principle of nation-states allowed the soothingly comprehensible vision of polities as bound up together by economic fate, all in the same large boat called the national economy, competing with other national economies in a worldwide regatta' (Reich 1991: 4–5; quoted in Larner and Walters 2002: 401).

This intensified territorialization of social relations at a national scale suggests that 'the state-centric nature of social science faithfully reflected the power containers that dominated the social world it was studying' (Taylor 1996: 1920). However, the theorization of capitalist sociospatial configuration outlined previously points toward a somewhat different interpretation: from this perspective, the epistemology of state-centrism is to be viewed less as a faithful reflection of its historical-geographical context than as a politically mediated misrecognition of that context. The epistemology of state-centrism was tightly enmeshed within the national-developmentalist round of deterritorialization and reterritorialization that unfolded during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. On the one hand, processes of space-time compression intensified dramatically in conjunction with the second industrial revolution, the globalizing expansion of the world economy, and the imperialist forays of the major capitalist national states. On the other hand, this dramatic spatial extension and temporal acceleration of capitalism was premised upon the construction of qualitatively new forms of capitalist sociospatial configuration—including, most crucially, the production, distribution, and consumption infrastructures of major industrial city-regions; newly consolidated, nationalized networks of market exchange, transportation, and communication; and the highly bureaucratized institutional-regulatory systems of national states. The essence of state-centric modes of analysis, I would argue, is to focus one-sidedly upon a single term within this dialectic of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, that of territorial fixity, as embodied in the national state's bounded, territorialized form.

Lefebvre's (1991: 280) analysis of the modern state as a form of 'violence directed towards a space' helps illuminate this territorialist misrecognition. In Lefebvre's view, modern national states are grounded upon a relentless drive to rationalize, unify, and homogenize social relations within their territorial boundaries: 'Each state claims to produce a space wherein something is accomplished, a space, even, where something is brought to perfection: namely, a

unified and hence homogenous society' (Lefebvre 1991: 281). But, as he (1991: 308) is quick to add: 'The space that homogenizes . . . has nothing homogenous about it.' One of the basic epistemological features of state-centric modes of analysis is to conflate the historical *tendency* towards the territorialization of social relations on a national scale—which has undoubtedly intensified during much of the twentieth century—with its full historical *realization*. Processes of territorialization and nationalization are thus represented as pregiven, natural conditions of social life rather than being seen as the products of historically specific strategies of parcelization, centralization, enclosure, and encaging at a national scale. Accordingly, as Lefebvre (1991: 287, italics in original) elaborates with reference to the 'abstract space' of modern capitalism:

> Abstract space *is not* homogenous; it simply *has* homogeneity as its goal, its orientation, its 'lens'. And, indeed, it renders homogenous. But in itself it is multiform [. . .] Thus to look upon abstract space as homogeneous is to embrace a representation that takes the effect for the cause, and the goal for the reason why the goal was pursued. A representation which passes itself off as a *concept*, when it is merely an image, a mirror and a mirage; and which instead of challenging, instead of refusing, merely *reflects*. And what does such a specular representation reflect? It reflects the result sought.

Only in this specific sense, then, did the epistemology of state-centrism 'reflect' its historical-geographical context—not through an operation of mimesis, but rather through a form of reification in which the 'result sought', the 'fetishization of space in the service of the state', is treated as an actualized reality rather than as an unstable tendency within an ongoing dialectic (Lefebvre 1991: 21).

The crucial point, therefore, is that territorialization, on any spatial scale, must be viewed as a historically specific, incomplete, and conflictual *process* rather than as a pregiven, natural, or permanent condition. To the extent that the national scale (or any other geographical scale) acquires tendential primacy as an organizational arena for social, political, and economic relations, this must be viewed as a historically contingent outcome of scale-specific projects and strategies rather than being conceived as the expression of an ontological necessity. By contrast, state-centric epistemologies freeze the image of national state territoriality into a generalized feature of social life, and thereby neglect to consider the ways in which the latter has been produced and continually transformed during the history of capitalist development.

Rescaling territoriality: from globalization to the relativization of scales

As noted at the outset of this chapter, the geographies of capitalism have been profoundly transformed since the early 1970s, leading many commentators to acknowledge the socially produced, and therefore malleable, character of

inherited formations of political-economic space. Smith (1996: 50–1) has aptly described this state of affairs as follows:

> The solidity of the geography of twentieth century capitalism at various scales has melted; habitual spatial assumptions about the world have evaporated [. . .] It is as if the world map as jig-saw puzzle had been tossed in the air these last two decades, leaving us to reconstruct a viable map of everything from bodily and local change to global identity. Under these circumstances, the taken-for-grantedness of space is impossible to sustain. Space is increasingly revealed as a richly political and social product, and putting the jig-saw puzzle back together—in practice as well as in theory—is a highly contested affair.

Smith's formulation puts into stark relief what is arguably one of the central methodological challenges of contemporary globalization research—namely, to map the geographies of contemporary capitalism in ways that transcend the 'habitual spatial assumptions' of state-centric epistemologies. As the geographical foundations of twentieth-century capitalism are unsettled and reworked, an urgent need arises for analytical frameworks that do not imprison the sociological imagination within timeless, territorialist, and unhistorical representations of social space.

To date, however, most globalization researchers have confronted this methodological challenge in one of two deeply problematic ways—either (*a*) through an analysis of the global scale in implicitly state-centric terms, as a globally stretched territorial grid; or (*b*) through an emphasis on processes of deterritorialization that purportedly trigger the erosion of national state territoriality as such. The former approach transposes state-centric mappings of space onto the global scale, and thus remains trapped within a narrowly territorialist understanding of contemporary capitalism. The latter approach transcends the territorialist epistemology of state-centrism on the basis of two equally problematic assumptions: (*a*) the notion that globalization is an essentially non-territorial, borderless, supraterritorial, or territorially disembedded process; and (*b*) the notion that globalization entails the contraction or erosion of national state power. In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that neither of these methodological strategies can provide an adequate mapping of contemporary sociospatial transformations. In the course of this discussion, I also begin to sketch the general interpretation of contemporary rescaling processes that will be developed at length in the rest of this book.

The crux of my argument is the proposition that the contemporary round of global restructuring has radically reconfigured the scalar organization of territorialization processes under capitalism, relativizing the primacy of the national scale while simultaneously enhancing the role of subnational and supranational scales in such processes. The contemporary round of globalization arguably represents a major new wave of deterritorialization and reterritorialization in which global socioeconomic interdependencies are being significantly extended in close conjunction with the establishment, or restructuring, of relatively fixed forms of capitalist sociospatial organization at diverse,

subglobal geographical scales. Crucially, however, the political-economic geographies of this dynamic of deterritorialization and reterritorialization are today being fundamentally rescaled relative to the nationally configured patterns in which it has unfolded since the late nineteenth century. Whereas previous rounds of deterritorialization and reterritorialization occurred largely within the geographical framework of national state territoriality, the current round of sociospatial restructuring has significantly decentered the role of the national scale as the primary institutional arena for the territorialization of capital.

Collinge (1996) has characterized these multifaceted shifts as a 'relativization of scales' in which, in marked contrast to earlier configurations of capitalist sociospatial organization, no single level of political-economic interaction currently predominates over any others (see also Jessop 2002). As this process of scale-relativization has proceeded apace, a range of subnational and supranational sociospatial configurations—from global city-regions, industrial districts, and regional state institutions to multinational economic blocks, supranational regulatory institutions, and regimes of global governance—have acquired major roles as geographical infrastructures for the reproduction of global capitalism. Swyngedouw (1992*a*: 40) describes contemporary scalar transformations in closely analogous terms:

> Over the last decade or so the relative dominance of the nation state as a scale level has changed to give way to new configurations in which both the local/regional and the transnational/global have risen to prominence. Global corporations, global financial movements and global politics play deciding roles in the structuring of daily life, while simultaneously more attention is paid to local and regional responses and restructuring processes. There is, in other words, a double movement of globalisation on the one hand and devolution, decentralisation or localisation on the other [. . .] [T]he local/global interplay of contemporary restructuring processes should be thought of as a single, combined process with two inherently related, albeit contradictory movements and as a process which involves a *de facto* recomposition of the articulation of the geographical scales of economic and of social life.

For Swyngedouw, these rescaling processes represent a conflictual dynamic of 'glocalization' in which global sociospatial integration is proceeding in tandem with a pervasive triadization, regionalization, and localization of social relations.[14] In this sense, 'globalization is not just about one scale becoming more important than the rest; it is also about changes in the very nature of the relationships between scales' (Dicken, Tickell, and Peck 1997:

[14] See also Swyngedouw 1997, 2000*a*. According to Robertson (1994: 36), the term 'glocalization' originated in Japanese business discourse, where it was used in the 1980s as a marketing buzzword to describe the adaptation of global corporate strategies to locally specific conditions. This term is not unproblematic, however, not least because of its apparent implication that *two* geographical scales, the global and the local, dominate contemporary rescaling processes. Like Swyngedouw, I reject this limited view of contemporary spatial transformations and insist upon their fundamentally multiscalar character. For, in addition to the global and the local, a variety of other scales—including the body, the urban, the regional, the national, and the supranational—are likewise key arenas and targets of currently unfolding rescaling processes. Moreover, the political, institutional, and cultural

159–60). The key notions of the relativization of scales and glocalization are summarized in Fig. 2.2.

The relativization of scales (Collinge 1996; Jessop 2002)	The entrenched primacy of the national scale of political-economic organization is being undermined New sociospatial configurations and geographies of socio-political struggle are proliferating at both supranational and subnational scales No single scale of political-economic organization or sociopolitical struggle predominates over others
Glocalization (Swyngedouw 1997, 1992*a*)	The process of global integration is proceeding in tandem with a reconfiguration of sociospatial configurations at various subglobal scales—including the supranational, the national, the regional, and the urban The scalar organization of political-economic life is being fundamentally recast; entrenched scalar hierarchies are being rearticulated; and intense struggles are proliferating regarding the appropriate configuration of scales in social, economic, and political life

Fig. 2.2. Globalization as a process of rescaling: two key concepts

The central consequence of these processes of rescaling has been to thrust the apparently ossified, entrenched fixity of national state territoriality abruptly and dramatically into historical motion, radically redefining its geographical significance, its organizational configuration, and its linkages to both subnational and supranational scales. Processes of territorialization remain endemic to capitalism, but today they are jumping at once above, below, and around the national scale upon which they tendentially converged during much of the last century. Consequently, state territoriality currently operates less as an isomorphic, self-enclosed block of absolute space than as a polymorphic, multiscalar institutional mosaic composed of multiple, partially overlapping institutional forms and regulatory configurations that are neither congruent, contiguous, nor coextensive with one another (Anderson 1996). I view this rescaling of national territoriality as the *differentia specifica* of the currently unfolding round of global sociospatial restructuring. Even though

expressions of each of these scales are being significantly redefined under contemporary conditions, thereby undermining any conceptual grammar that treats scales as if they were stable, fixed entities or platforms. Despite these analytical dangers, the notion of glocalization is useful because, like the concept of the relativization of scales, it underscores the ways in which inherited scalar hierarchies are being shaken up and rejigged under contemporary capitalism. For discussions of glocalization by other authors, see, for instance, Courchene 1995; Galland 1996; Bauman 1998; and Kraidy 1999.

contemporary forms of deterritorialization have partially eroded the container-like qualities of national borders, I shall argue that national states continue to operate as essential political and institutional sites for, and mediators of, the territorialization of social, political, and economic relations. The key point is that the political-economic geographies of this territorialization process are no longer focused predominantly upon any single, self-enclosed geographical scale.

In the next two sections, the notion of a rescaling of national territoriality is further developed through a critical analysis of the two major strands of globalization research mentioned above. Because so much of globalization research remains grounded upon state-centric or otherwise deeply problematic geographical assumptions, I consider this type of epistemological critique to be a crucial prerequisite for the project of developing a more geographically reflexive and scale-sensitive approach to the investigation of contemporary sociospatial transformations.

Global territorialism: state-centrism on a world scale

> It is truly astonishing that the concept of territoriality has been so little studied by students of international politics: its neglect is akin to never looking at the ground one is walking on.
>
> John Ruggie (1993: 174)

All accounts of globalization entail some version of the claim that the global scale has become increasingly important as an organizing locus of social relations. However, this emphasis on the global scale among globalization researchers has been intertwined with extraordinarily diverse conceptualizations of global social space. This section considers approaches to globalization studies that conceive global space in essentially state-centric terms, as a pregiven territorial container or as a form of territoriality stretched onto the global scale.

The deployment of this type of methodology—to which I shall refer as 'global territorialism'—is frequently quite explicit, as in Albrow's (1990: 9) definition of globalization as 'those processes by which the peoples of the world are incorporated into a single world society, a global society'. The concept of 'world society' has played a defining role within a major strand of mainstream research on globalization, according to which globalization entails not only the growing interconnectedness of distinct parts of the globe, but—in Waters's (1995: 3) characteristic formulation—the construction of 'a *single* society and culture occupying the planet'.[15] Other globalization

[15] Italics added. For other typical uses of the concept of 'world society' among globalization researchers see, for instance, Spybey 1996; Hondrich 1992; Meyer 1999; Meyer, et al. 1997; Shaw 1992; and Waters 1995. For critical discussions of this approach see Marden 1997; McGrew 1992; and Altvater and Mahnkopf 1995.

researchers have elaborated closely analogous accounts of 'global culture' and 'transnational civil society'.[16]

In each case, the modifier 'global' is positioned before a traditionally state-centric, territorialist concept—society, civil society, or culture—in order to demarcate a realm of social interaction that transcends the borders of any single state territory. Whether this sphere of interaction is understood in normative terms (for instance, as a site of universalistic values such as human rights, equality, peace, and democracy), institutionally (for instance, as a framework of globally standardized economic, political, educational, and scientific practices), or experientially (for instance, as a worldwide diffusion of American, European, or Western cultural influences), world society approaches share an underlying conception of global space as a structural analog to state territoriality. Insofar as the interpretation of global space is derived directly from an understanding of the territorially configured spaces of national societies and national cultures, the question of the qualitative socio-spatial organization of world-scale processes is essentially foreclosed through a choice of conceptual grammar. The difference between global and national configurations of social space is thereby reduced to a matter of geographical size. Meanwhile, because globalization is understood primarily as a world-scale process, the role of national and subnational territorial transformations in contemporary processes of global restructuring cannot be explicitly analyzed. In this sense, even as their unit of analysis is extended beyond national territorial boundaries, world society approaches remain embedded within a state-centric epistemology that conceives space—on both global and national scales—as a timeless, territorial container of social relations. The preconstituted geographical space of the globe is presumed simply to be filled by the social practices associated with the process of globalization rather than being produced, reconfigured, or transformed through the latter.

Robertson's neo-Parsonian cultural sociology of globalization, as articulated in his book *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (1992), exemplifies a somewhat less explicit but still widely influential version of a global territorialist approach.[17] Here, global space is not characterized through directly state-centric terms such as society or culture, but rather through the more geographically ambiguous categories of place and field. For Robertson, globalization is a multifaceted process that has led to the formation of what he terms a situation of 'global unicity'—the development of the world 'as a single place' or 'the concrete structuration of the world as a whole' (6, 53, *passim*). Robertson's analysis of globalization consists of a synchronic aspect (a 'dimensional model' of the 'global field') and a diachronic aspect (a 'sequential phase model of globalization'). According to Robertson, the global field is an underlying structural matrix upon which sociocultural conceptions of the world are organized; its components are the 'quintessential features of the terms in

[16] See e.g. Lipschutz 1992; Peterson 1992; Spybey 1996; and Wapner 1995.

[17] All parenthetic citations in the following two paragraphs refer to this work.

which it is possible to conceive of the world' (32). Robertson classifies the latter according to four basic dimensions, 'societies, individuals, the system of societies and mankind', which are together said to constitute the 'global-human condition' (26, 77–8). Globalization is then defined as a heightened 'self-consciousness' of the relations among these dimensions that in turn leads to an increasing 'differentiation of the main spheres of globality' (26–9, 50–1). Robertson elaborates a five-stage periodization to describe this world-historical trend towards intensified 'global unicity': the 'germinal' phase (15th–18th centuries); the 'incipient' phase (mid-18th century to 1870s); the 'take-off' phase (1870s–1920s); the 'struggle-for-hegemony' phase (1920s–1960s); and the 'uncertainty' phase (1960s–present) (58–60).

Despite Robertson's concern to analyze world-scale processes, his analysis reproduces a state-centric conceptualization of global space as a timeless, territorial framework that contains historicity without itself evolving historically. First, Robertson conceives the global scale as a self-enclosed territorial container within which the structural differentiation of individuals, societies, inter-societal relations, and humanity occurs: 'globality' is viewed essentially as a macrogeographical formation of (national) territoriality. Thus conceived, as in the world society approaches discussed above, globalization entails an intermeshing of preconstituted *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* structures on the scale of the 'world-as-a-whole' rather than a qualitative restructuring, reterritorialization, or rescaling of these inherited, statist forms of territorial organization. Second, Robertson's conception of global space is essentially unhistorical. Robertson analyzes the changing interdependencies between individuals, states, societies, and the 'global-human condition' in orthodox Parsonsian terms, as a unilinear, evolutionary process of structural differentiation among preconstituted spatial scales (Parsons 1971). This differentiation is said to occur within the pregiven space of globality; yet this global space is not said to be constituted, modified, or transformed historically. Instead, the global field is viewed as an invariant, systemic hierarchy, stretching from the individual and society to the interstate system and the global human condition. In Robertson's theorization, the globalization process passes through each of these components without qualitatively transforming them or the scalar hierarchy in which they are embedded. Consequently, by subsuming currently unfolding global transformations within a universal, historically invariant process of structural differentiation, Robertson's analysis excludes a priori the possibility of a fundamental rearticulation of entrenched scalar hierarchies or of other qualitative sociospatial transformations at any geographical scale. Robertson's cultural sociology of globalization therefore entails the transposition of state-centric modes of analysis onto a world scale rather than their transcendence.

A radically different, but equally problematic, form of global territorialism can be found within Wallerstein's approach to world-system analysis, which is otherwise among the most sustained critiques of explicitly state-centric frameworks yet to be developed in the social sciences. By demonstrating the

longue durée and macrogeographical parameters of capitalism, Wallerstein's pioneering studies have also served as a useful corrective to excessively presentist interpretations of the post-1970s wave of globalization that exaggerate its discontinuity with earlier historical configurations of capitalist development.[18] Despite these substantial achievements, I believe that Wallerstein's theoretical framework replicates on a global scale the methodological territorialism of the very state-centric epistemologies he has otherwise criticized so effectively. To elaborate this claim, the intersection of global space and national state territoriality in Wallerstein's approach to world-system analysis must be examined more closely.

Wallerstein conceptualizes capitalism as a geographically integrated historical system grounded upon a single division of labor. Global space is conceived neither as a society, a culture, or a place, but rather in terms of the more geographically and historically specific notion of the 'modern world-system'. Although Wallerstein defines the capitalist world-system on multiple levels—for instance, in terms of the drive towards ceaseless accumulation; the commodification of production, distribution, and investment processes; and the antagonistic class relation between capitalists and wage-laborers—he argues repeatedly that its unique *scalar* form is one of its constitutive features.[19] In contradistinction to previous historical systems ('world-empires'), in which the division of labor, state power, and cultural forms overlapped more or less congruently within the same territorial domains, capitalism is composed of 'a *single* division of labor but *multiple* polities and cultures'.[20] It is through this abstract contrast between two geometrical images—world-empires in which the division of labor is spatially congruent with structures of politico-cultural organization; and world-economies in which a single division of labor encompasses multiple states and multiple cultural formations—that Wallerstein delineates the geographical foundations of modern capitalism. In essence, Wallerstein grasps the specificity of capitalist spatiality in terms of the territorial non-congruence of economic structures ('singular') with politico-institutional and cultural forms ('multiple'). According to Wallerstein, the long-run reproduction of capitalism has hinged crucially upon the durability of this scalar arrangement, which has provided capital with 'a freedom of maneuver that is structurally based [and has thereby] made possible the constant economic expansion of the world-system' (Wallerstein 1974: 348). On this basis, Wallerstein outlines the long-run history of world capitalism with reference to three intersecting spatio-temporal processes—first, the Kondratieff cycles, secular trends, and systemic crises of the world-scale accumulation process; second, the cycles of hegemonic ascension and decline among the

[18] See Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989, 2000. On the specific problematic of space in world-system analysis see Wallerstein 1988.

[19] For various definitions of capitalism in Wallerstein's work see, for instance, Wallerstein 1983: 13–19; 1979: 7–19; 1974: 37–8, 348.

[20] Wallerstein 1979: 6; italics added. See also Wallerstein 1974: 67, 348–9.

core states; and third, the geographical incorporation of external areas until, by the late nineteenth century, the international division of labor had become coextensive with most of the planet's physical-geographical surface.[21]

However, considering Wallerstein's avowed concern to transcend state-centric models of capitalist modernity, national state territories occupy a surprisingly pivotal theoretical position within his conceptual framework. Although the division of labor in the capitalist world-economy is said to be stratified into three supra-state zones (core, semi-periphery, and periphery), Wallerstein argues that its most elemental geographical units are nevertheless national states, or more precisely, the bounded territories over which national states attempt to exercise sovereignty. To be sure, Wallerstein maintains that the division of labor within the world-system transcends the territorial boundaries of each national state; yet he consistently describes the historical dynamics of the world economy in terms of the differential positions of national states within its stratified core–periphery structure, rather than, for instance, with reference to firms, industries, circuits of capital, urban systems, or spatial divisions of labor. For Wallerstein, then, the economic division of labor is intrinsically composed of states; capitalist enterprises are in turn said to be 'domiciled' within their associated national state territories.[22] Wallerstein's conception of global space is thus most precisely described as an *inter-state* division of labor: national state territoriality serves as the basic geographical unit of the world economy; meanwhile global space is parcelized among three zonal patterns (core, semi-periphery, periphery) that are in turn said to be composed of nationally scaled territorial economies. National state territoriality and global space are thereby fused together into a seamless national-global scalar topography in which the interstate system and the world economy operate as a single, integrated system.[23]

In this sense, Wallerstein's concern to analyze the global scale as a distinctive unit of analysis does not lead to any qualitative modification in the way in which this space is conceptualized. In Wallerstein's framework, the primary geographical units of global space are defined by the territorial boundaries of national states, which in turn constitute a single, encompassing macro-territoriality, the world interstate system. The national scale is thereby blended into the global scale while the global scale is essentially flattened into its national components. As in the tale of the traveler Gulliver who encounters identical micro- and macro-scopic replications of human society, a society of midgets and a society of giants, the global and the national scales are viewed as structural analogs of a single spatial form—territoriality.[24] Thus conceived, the global scale simply multiplies national territoriality throughout a global

[21] In addition to the three volumes of *The Modern World-System*, see also the essays included in Wallerstein 1979, 1984.

[22] See e.g. Wallerstein 1984: 39, 27–36; 1983.

[23] It is not accurate, therefore, to reproach Wallerstein for reducing state power to economic structure (Skocpol 1977), because in his framework the latter are fundamentally identical.

[24] On this 'Gulliver fallacy', see R. B. J. Walker 1993: 133–40.

patchwork without modifying its essential geographical attributes. I would argue, therefore, that Wallerstein's approach to world-system analysis entails the replication of a territorialist model of space not only on the national scale of the territorial state but on the global scale of the entire world system.

Wallerstein's methodological fusion of the global and the national scales also leads to an interpretation of contemporary globalization primarily as a physical-geographical expansion of the capitalist system rather than as a rearticulation or transformation of the social, political, and economic spaces upon which it is based. To be sure, Wallerstein conceives global space as a complex historical product of capitalist expansion, but he acknowledges its historicity only in a limited sense, in contrast to previous historical systems such as world-empires. For, within the capitalist historical system, space appears to be frozen into a single geometric crystallization—'one economy, multiple states'—that cannot change qualitatively without dissolving capitalism's identity as a distinctive type of historical system. In Wallerstein's framework, each long wave of capitalist expansion is said to reproduce the structurally invariant geographical pattern upon which capitalism is grounded, a grid of nationally organized state territories linked through a core–periphery structure to a global division of labor. Paradoxically, then, Wallerstein's definition of the modern world-system as a global amalgamation of national spaces generates a fundamentally state-centric methodological consequence—namely, the assumption that a specifically capitalist form of globalization can unfold only among *nationally scaled* forms of political-economic organization. The possibility that the process of capitalist development might unhinge itself from this entrenched national-global scalar couplet to privilege other subnational or supranational sociospatial configurations is thereby excluded by definitional fiat.[25]

Two general methodological conclusions may be derived from this critical analysis of global territorialist approaches.

1. An emphasis on the global spatial scale does not necessarily lead to an overcoming of state-centric epistemologies. Global territorialist approaches represent global space in a state-centric manner, as a pregiven territorial container within which the process of globalization unfolds, rather than analyzing its historical production, reconfiguration, and transformation. As noted, one of the major deficiencies of state-centric modes of analysis is to conceive territorialization as a static condition rather than as an ongoing, dialectical process. Global territorialist approaches are premised upon the transposition of this state-centric misrecognition from the national to the global scale. The current round of global restructuring does indeed appear to be intensifying globally scaled forms of interaction and interdependence. However, global territorialist

[25] It should be emphasized, however, that these problems with Wallerstein's theory are not intrinsic to world-system analysis. For attempts to develop more historically specific analyses of capitalist spatiality within the broad parameters of a world-system methodology see e.g. Arrighi 1994; Taylor 1994, 1995.

approaches reify this emergent, contradictory tendency into an actualized, globally scaled territorial system and thus circumvent the key methodological task of analyzing global space as an historically constituted, polymorphic arena composed of multiple, superimposed spatial forms.

2. State-centric conceptions of global space mask the national state's own crucial role as a site and agent of global restructuring processes. The global territorialist approaches discussed above treat national state territoriality as a static institutional framework over and above which globalization occurs, and thereby bracket the profound transformations of state territorial and scalar organization that have played a crucial enabling role in the contemporary round of global restructuring. The persistence of state-centric epistemologies in globalization studies thus represents a major intellectual barrier to a more adequate understanding of currently emergent forms of national state territoriality and state scalar organization.

These arguments are summarized schematically in Fig. 2.3.

Main features	Two of the three key components of state-centric modes of analysis—spatial fetishism and methodological territorialism—are transposed from the national to the global scale Consequently: the global scale is analyzed (*a*) as a pregiven, unchanging arena for social relations; and/or (*b*) as a grid of national territorialities stretched onto the global scale
Prominent examples	• 'World society' approaches (Meyer 1999; Spybey 1996; Wapner 1995; Waters 1995) • Robertson's (1992) cultural sociology of globalization • Wallerstein's approach to world-system analysis (Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1984, 1989)
Problems and limitations	Neglects to examine systematically (*a*) the historical constitution and continual transformation of the global scale as an arena of diverse social, economic, and political processes, or (*b*) the complex, continually changing interdependencies between global and subglobal relations Territoriality is conceived as the natural form in which sociospatial processes are organized; consequently, the polymorphic geographies of the global scale are described in a narrowly territorialist conceptual grammar Neglects to examine (*a*) the key role of national states in contemporary processes of global restructuring; and (*b*) the ways in which national states are in turn being reshaped through their role in animating and mediating these processes

Fig. 2.3. The epistemology of global territorialism: schematic overview

As suggested above, the contemporary round of global restructuring can be fruitfully conceived as a conflictual rearticulation of political-economic space on multiple, superimposed geographical scales. I shall now consider these sociospatial transformations more closely through a critical discussion of 'deterritorialization' approaches to globalization studies.

Jumping scales: between deterritorialization and reterritorialization

> The question that remains open is whether territory loses its institutional role in general or whether we are just in one of the eras of rescaling of territorial resources, as in the transition from Habsburg to French power, or Dutch to British commercial strategies in the late seventeenth century, or from the province and the land to the national state and the metropolis after 1860.
>
> Charles Maier (2000: 824–5)

> As globalization intensifies it generates pressures towards a reterritorialization of socio-economic activity in the form of subnational, regional and supranational economic zones, mechanisms of governance and cultural complexes. It may also reinforce the 'localization' and 'nationalization' of societies. Accordingly, globalization involves a complex deterritorialization and reterritorialization of political and economic power.
>
> David Held et al. (1999: 28)

In contrast to global territorialist approaches, analyses of deterritorialization confront explicitly the task of analyzing social spatiality in a historically specific manner. From this perspective, territoriality is viewed as a historically specific form of sociospatial organization that is being systematically decentered under contemporary conditions. New supraterritorial geographies of networks and flows are said to be supplanting the inherited geography of state territories that has long preoccupied the social-scientific imagination. Deterritorialization researchers have analyzed these emergent, purportedly post-territorial geographies as the outcomes of diverse causal processes, including the deployment of new informational, military, and transportation technologies; the internationalization of capital, monetary, and financial markets; the virtualization of economic activity through electronically mediated monetary transactions; the global crisis of territorialized definitions of state regulation and citizenship; the expanded activities of transnational organizations, including multinational corporations and NGOs; the intensified role of electronic media in organizing sociocultural identities; the proliferation of worldwide ecological problems; and the increasing density and

velocity of transnational diasporic population movements (for an overview, see Scholte 2000).

In most research on deterritorialization, the spaces of globalization (based upon circulation, flows, and geographical mobility) and the spaces of territorialization (based upon enclosure, borders, and geographical fixity) are represented as mutually opposed systems of social interaction. Thus, for O'Brien (1992: 1–2), global financial integration has generated a situation in which 'geographical location no longer matters, or matters less than hitherto [. . .] Money . . . will largely succeed in escaping the confines of the existing geography.' Likewise, in their widely discussed book, *Empire*, Hardt and Negri (2001: 336) speak of a 'general equalization or smoothing of social space' in which capital supersedes entrenched territorial borders and the power of national states is effectively dissolved. More generally, for Scholte (1996: 1968):

> Global space is placeless, distanceless and borderless—and in this sense 'supraterritorial'. In global relations, people are connected with one another pretty much irrespective of their territorial position. To that extent they effectively do not have a territorial location, apart from the broad sense of being situated on the planet earth. Global relations thus form a non-, extra-, post-, supra-territorial aspect of the world system. In the global domain, territorial boundaries present no particular impediment and distance is covered in effectively no time.

This image of global space as a 'placeless, distanceless and borderless' realm is the geographical essence of deterritorialization approaches. From Castells' (1996) account of the 'space of flows', Jameson's (1992) theorization of 'postmodern hyperspace', Ruggie's (1993) interpretation of the EU as the world's 'first postmodern political form', and Appadurai's (1996) concept of 'ethnoscapes' to Scholte's (2000) conceptualization of globality as 'supraterritoriality', Ohmae's (1995) notion of a 'borderless world', O'Brien's (1992) thesis of an 'end of geography', and Hardt and Negri's (2001) notion of 'Empire', analyses of deterritorialization have generally been premised upon this basic conceptual opposition between the purportedly supraterritorial or deterritorialized spaces in which globalization occurs and diverse subglobal territories, localities, and places.[26]

The logical corollary of this conceptualization is the contention that globalization entails the decline, erosion, or disempowerment of the national state. Whereas global territorialist approaches map global space essentially as a territorial state writ large, studies of deterritorialization invert this territorialist epistemology to emphasize the increasing permeability or even total negation of national state territoriality. The decline of national state power is viewed at once as the medium and the result of contemporary processes of deterritorialization. On the one hand, the erosion of nationally scaled forms of territorial enclosure is said to open up a space for increasingly non-territorial forms of interaction and

[26] For still more extreme versions of the 'end of geography' thesis, see Der Derian 1990; Virilio 1984.

interdependence on a global scale. On the other hand, these globally scaled processes of deterritorialization are in turn said to accelerate the state's loss of control over its national borders and thus further to undermine its territorial self-enclosure. In this sense, the state decline thesis and the notion of deterritorialization entail cumulative, mutually reinforcing rather than merely additive, externally related conceptions of global sociospatial transformation. Global space can be viewed as non-territorial in form precisely because it is defined through the trope of an eroding or disappearing national scale. Meanwhile, the thesis of state decline is elaborated not through an account of the national scale per se, but rather with reference to the role of various globally scaled, purportedly supraterritorial and deterritorializing socioeconomic processes.

By emphasizing the historicity and potential malleability of territoriality, deterritorialization approaches have begun to articulate an important challenge to the epistemology of state-centrism. This methodological denaturalization of territoriality has also enabled deterritorialization researchers to construct alternative geographical categories for describing currently emergent sociospatial forms that do not presuppose their enclosure within territorially bounded spaces. Nevertheless, when examined through the lens of the conception of capitalist sociospatial configuration outlined above, deterritorialization approaches contain three serious deficiencies.

1. The historicity of territoriality is reduced to an either/or choice between two options, its presence or its absence. Consequently, the possibility that territoriality is being reconfigured and rescaled rather than eroded cannot be adequately explored.
2. The relation between global space and national territoriality is viewed as a zero-sum game in which the growing importance of the former is presumed necessarily to entail the decline of the latter. By conceiving geographical scales as mutually exclusive rather than as co-constitutive, relationally intertwined levels of social interaction, this dualistic conceptualization cannot adequately theorize the essential role of subglobal transformations—whether of supranational political-economic blocs, national state territories, regions, cities, localities, or places—in contemporary processes of global restructuring.
3. Most crucially for the argument of this book, deterritorialization approaches bracket the various forms of spatial fixity, spatial embedding, rescaling, and reterritorialization upon which global flows are premised. From this perspective, processes of deterritorialization are not delinked from territoriality; indeed, their very existence presupposes the production and continual reproduction of fixed socio-territorial infrastructures—including, in particular, urban-regional agglomerations and state regulatory institutions—within, upon, and through which global flows can circulate. Thus the apparent deterritorialization of social relations on a global scale hinges intrinsically upon their reterritorialization within relatively fixed and immobile sociospatial configurations at a variety of interlocking subglobal scales.

A major agenda of this book is to advance an interpretation of contemporary global restructuring as a rescaling of the nationally organized sociospatial configurations that have long served as the underlying geographical scaffolding for capitalist development. In the context of this ongoing scalar shift, processes of deterritorialization can be reinterpreted as concerted yet uncoordinated strategies to decenter the national scale of political-economic organization. If territoriality operates as a strategy grounded upon the enclosure of social relations within a bounded geographical space (Sack 1986), deterritorialization may be understood most coherently as a countervailing strategy to 'jump scales', that is, to circumvent or dismantle historically entrenched scalar hierarchies (Smith 1995). From this point of view, one of the most significant geographical consequences of contemporary processes of deterritorialization has been to unsettle and rearticulate the entrenched, nationally scaled configurations of political-economic organization upon which capitalist industrial growth has been grounded since at least the late nineteenth century. This denationalizing, scale-jumping strategy has also been closely intertwined with various conflictual forms of reterritorialization through which new subnational and supranational sociospatial configurations are being constructed. Crucially, however, the national territorial state—albeit now significantly rescaled and reterritorialized—has continued to serve as a crucial geographical infrastructure for this multiscalar dialectic of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. These arguments may be specified further through a critical reinterpretation of two commonly invoked forms of deterritorialization—the deterritorialization of capital; and the deterritorialization of the national state.

The rescaling of capital

The concept of deterritorialization was first developed in the early 1970s to describe the apparently footloose activities of transnational corporations in coordinating globally dispersed production networks (Agnew and Corbridge 1994). Since this period, the notion of deterritorialization has acquired a broader meaning to encompass as well the role of new information and communications technologies in linking geographically dispersed parts of the globe to create a temporally integrated world economy. The massive expansion in the role of transnational finance capital since the demise of the Bretton Woods currency controls in the early 1970s presents a further indication of capital's increasing velocity and geographical mobility in the world economy. Under these circumstances, the worldwide circulation of capital can no longer be analyzed adequately with reference to self-enclosed, discrete national economies or, more generally, on the basis of strictly territorial representations of space (Agnew 1994).

Nonetheless, no matter how rapidly turnover times are accelerated, the moment of territorialization still remains endemic to capital, a basic structural feature of its circulation process. Capital remains as dependent as ever upon

relatively fixed, localized and territorially embedded technological-institutional ensembles in which technology, the means of production, forms of industrial organization and labor-power are productively combined to extract surplus value. For, as Yeung (1998: 291) succinctly remarks, capital is 'place-sticky'. The processes of deterritorialization associated with the current round of geoeconomic integration are best conceived as one moment within a broader dynamic of sociospatial transformation in which the reindustrialization of strategic subnational economic spaces—such as global cities, industrial districts, technopoles, offshore financial centers, and other flexible production complexes—has played a constitutive role.[27] These shifts have been closely intertwined with a marked rescaling of corporate accumulation strategies as key factions of industrial, financial, and service capital attempt to secure competitive advantages within global production chains through the exploitation of locally and regionally specific conditions of production (Swyngedouw 1992*a*). Although the growth of these urban and regional territorial production complexes has been crucially conditioned by national political-economic frameworks, a number of scholars have suggested that, due to these new forms of global localization, urbanized regions are today increasingly superseding national economies as the most rudimentary geographical units of world capitalism.[28] This pervasive rescaling of capital is illustrated schematically in Fig. 2.4.

The essential point here is that capital's drive to diminish its place-dependency does not, in practice, entail the construction of a quasi-autonomous, placeless, or distanceless space of flows, as writers such as Castells, Ohmae, Hardt and Negri, and many others have implied. We are witnessing, rather, a profoundly uneven rescaling and reterritorialization of the historically entrenched, state-centric geographical infrastructures that underpinned the last century of capitalist industrialization. From this point of view, scholarly representations of contemporary global capitalism as a 'smooth world' (Hardt and Negri 2001) or as a borderless 'space of flows' (Castells 1996) are grounded upon an uncritical appropriation of a neoliberal ideological myth. Such arguments, as Radice (1998: 274) remarks, amount to 'ideological cover for the policy preferences of big business'. In a forceful critique of Castells' recent writings, Smith (1996: 72) further elaborates this point:

> Capital [...] may entertain the fantasy of spacelessness and act accordingly, but in practice, every strategy to avoid and supersede 'historically established mechanisms' [i.e. places] and territories of social control involves not the extinction of place per se but *the reinvention of place at a different scale*—a capital-centered jumping of scale. Indeed, the perpetuation of control by these organizations (and classes) depends precisely on this reinvention of discrete places where power over and through the space of flows is rooted.

[27] The literature on these 'post-Fordist' forms of urban and regional restructuring has expanded massively in recent decades. For useful recent overviews see e.g. A. Amin 1994; Lipietz 1993; and Storper 1996.

[28] See e.g. Benko and Lipietz 2002; Scott 1998; Scott and Storper 1992; and S. Krätke 1995.



Fig. 2.4. Rescaling the geographies of capital
Source: derived from Swyngedouw 2000*b*: 548.

Deterritorialization must therefore be viewed as a distinctively geographical accumulation strategy, as a mechanism of global localization through which major capitalist firms are attempting to circumvent or restructure the nationally organized systems of social, monetary, and labor regulation that prevailed under the Fordist-Keynesian regime of accumulation (Swyngedouw 1992*a*).

To be sure, capitalist strategies of deterritorialization may well succeed in partially circumventing the constraints imposed by national territorial boundaries. But, even when successful, such strategies do not translate into a situation of pure capital hypermobility or placelessness. As capital strives to jump scale, it is forced to reconstitute or create anew viable sociospatial infrastructures for its circulation process at other scales—whether through the reorganization of existent scales or through the construction of qualitatively new ones. In this sense, capital's apparent transcendence of nationally scaled regulatory systems in recent decades has been inextricably bound up with the production of new subnational and supranational spaces of accumulation and state regulation that provide the place- and territory-specific conditions for accumulation (K. Cox 1997). Thus, rather than releasing capital from its endemic dependence upon places, cities, regions, and territories, the current round of geoeconomic integration has hinged upon 'a change in the scale at which spatial divisions of labor are organized' (K. Cox 1992: 428). The drive

towards deterritorialization incessantly reinscribes the role of capitalist sociospatial configurations while, at the same time, reconfiguring their scalar architecture in pursuit of locationally specific productive capacities and competitive advantages.

Rescaling the state

As noted, accounts of deterritorialization conceptualize the emergence of global space through the trope of a declining or eroding state territoriality. The current round of geoeconomic integration has indeed rendered states more permeable to transnational flows of capital, money, commodities, labor, and information. However, this development has not entailed the demise, erosion, or weakening of the state as such. Instead, there has been a significant functional, institutional, and geographical reorganization of statehood at a range of spatial scales. While these trends have unsettled the nationalized formations of statehood that have long preoccupied social scientists, they have not undermined the centrality of state institutions—albeit now significantly reterritorialized and rescaled—to processes of political-economic regulation.

During the global economic crises of the 1970s, traditional Keynesian macroeconomic policy instruments proved increasingly ineffectual across much of the older industrialized world. Under these conditions, the national states of the OECD zone began to restructure or dismantle major elements of the postwar Fordist-Keynesian regulatory order, such as national social welfare regimes, nationally organized collective bargaining arrangements, and national monetary frameworks (Jessop 1993). Among other major policy realignments, a range of supply-side regulatory strategies were deployed in order to facilitate industrial restructuring and to encourage flexibility and technological innovation within each state's territorial economy.[29] At this time, as Yeung (1998: 296–9) indicates, national states began actively to facilitate the process of geoeconomic integration through a variety of policy strategies—by constructing and enforcing the (global and national) legal regimes within which global capital operates; by providing key domestic conditions for the global operations of transnational corporations; by acquiring large shares or full ownership of major home-country based transnational corporations; by establishing territory-specific regulatory conditions for global capital investment; by establishing new supranational or global forms of economic governance; and by controlling key conditions for the reproduction of labor-power within their territorial borders. Consequently, the widely prevalent 'myth of the powerless state' (Weiss 1998) represents a misleading basis for the understanding of contemporary political dynamics: the state is not a helpless victim of globalization but one of its major politico-institutional catalysts. As Panitch (1994: 64) explains:

[29] On these policy reorientations and their longer-term institutional consequences, see, among other works, Jessop 1993; Helleiner 1994; Panitch 1994; Radice 1999; Sassen 1996; and Weiss 2003.

capitalist globalisation is a process which also takes place in, through and under the aegis of states; it is encoded by them and in important respects even authored by them; and it involves a shift in power relations within states that often means the centralisation and concentration of state powers as the necessary condition of and accompaniment to global market discipline.

Since the 1980s, throughout the OECD zone, global economic criteria have acquired an enhanced significance in the formulation and implementation of national state policies. This transformation has been famously described by R. Cox (1987: 260) as an 'internationalization of the state' in which 'adjustment to global competitiveness [has become] the new categorical imperative'. In a similar vein, Cerny (1995) has examined the consolidation of post-Keynesian 'competition states' whose central priority is to create a favorable investment climate for transnational capital within their boundaries. According to Cerny (1995: 620), as the mobilization of territorial competitiveness policies becomes an increasingly important priority for dominant actors and alliances across the political spectrum, 'the state itself becomes an agent for the commodification of the collective, situated in a wider, market-dominated playing field'. These realignments of state power in turn generate a 'whipsaw effect' in which each level of the state must react to a wide range of competitive forces, political pressures, and institutional constraints operating both within and beyond its boundaries (Cerny 1995: 618). A central geographical consequence of this development, Cerny (1995: 620–1) proposes, has been the establishment of new 'plurilateral' forms of state power that do not converge upon any single, optimal scale or coalesce together within an internally cohesive, nationally scaled bureaucratic hierarchy.

As we shall explore at length in subsequent chapters, the consolidation of post-Keynesian competition states in contemporary western Europe has indeed been closely intertwined with fundamental, if often rather haphazard, transformations of state spatial and scalar organization. These ongoing reterritorializations and rescalings of state space cannot be understood merely as defensive responses to intensified global economic competition, but represent expressions of concerted political strategies through which state institutions are attempting, at various spatial scales, to facilitate, manage, mediate, and redirect processes of geoeconomic restructuring. On a continental scale, states have promoted geoeconomic integration by forming supranational economic blocs such as the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, and the like, which are intended at once to enhance structural competitiveness, to facilitate capital mobility within new continental zones of accumulation, and to provide protective barriers against the pressures of global economic competition (Larner and Walters 2002; Mittelman 2000). Supranational agencies such as the IMF, the WTO, and the World Bank have likewise acquired key roles in enforcing neoliberal, market-led strategies of political-economic restructuring throughout the world system (Gill 1998*a*; Peet 2003). At the same time, even as national states

attempt to fracture or dismantle the institutional compromises of postwar Fordist-Keynesian capitalism in order to reduce domestic production costs, they have also devolved substantial regulatory responsibilities to regional and local institutions, which are seen to be better positioned to promote industrial (re)development within major urban and regional economies. This downscaling of regulatory tasks should not be viewed as a contraction or abdication of national state power, however, for it has frequently served as a centrally orchestrated strategy to promote transnational capital investment within major urban regions, whether through the public funding of large-scale infrastructural projects, the mobilization of localized economic development policies, the establishment of new forms of public–private partnership or other public initiatives intended to enhance urban territorial competitiveness (see Ch. 5). Figure 2.5 provides an initial, schematic representation of the rescaled landscape of statehood that has been forged through these transformations.

In subsequent chapters, I shall interpret the current wave of state rescaling within western European urban regions as an expression, medium, and outcome of diverse political strategies designed to enhance the place- and territory-specific competitive advantages of particular subnational political jurisdictions.



Fig. 2.5. Rescaling the geographies of statehood

Source: derived from Swyngedouw 2000*b*: 548.

In the present context, the key point is that these ongoing transformations of state institutional and spatial organization do not herald the end of territoriality as such, as deterritorialization theorists contend. We are witnessing, rather, the consolidation of increasingly polymorphic, reterritorialized political geographies in which territoriality is redifferentiated among multiple institutional levels that are no longer clustered around a single predominant center of gravity. Whereas the traditional Westphalian image of political space as a self-enclosed geographical container does today appear to have become increasingly obsolete, territoriality nevertheless remains a fundamental characteristic of statehood and an essential institutional scaffolding for the process of political-economic regulation at all spatial scales (Nevins 2002; D. Newman and Paasi 1998). As Fig. 2.5 illustrates, territoriality is no longer organized predominantly or exclusively on the national scale, for subnational and supranational levels of sociospatial organization have today come to play essential roles in processes of political-economic regulation. Under these circumstances, as Anderson (1996: 151) argues, new geographical metaphors are needed in order to grasp the structural features and dynamics of emergent, post-Westphalian political geographies:

> There may sometimes be a linear chain of command between institutions—or parts of institutions—at different levels, but in general such a linear model (like a Russian dolls metaphor of nested hierarchies) does not fit the complex reality. The contemporary world is not a ladder up or down which processes move from one rung to the next in an orderly fashion, the central state mediating all links between the external or higher levels and the internal or lower ones. That was never the case, but it is even less true today. Not only are there now more rungs but qualitatively they are more heterogeneous; and direct movements between high and low levels, missing out or bypassing 'intermediate' rungs, are now a defining characteristic of contemporary life. A complex set of climbing frames, slides, swings, ropes and rope ladders, complete with weak or broken parts [. . .] might be nearer the mark. The metaphor of adventure playgrounds, with their mixture of constructions, multiple levels and encouragement of movement—up, down, sideways, diagonally, directly from high to low, or low to high—captures the contemporary mixture of forms and processes much better than the ladder metaphor.

In subsequent chapters, I shall devote detailed attention to the many challenges of theorizing and analyzing such post-Westphalian political spaces, above all at subnational scales. As we shall see, large-scale urban regions represent crucial geographical, institutional, and political arenas in which the rescaled geographies of statehood under contemporary capitalism are being forged and contested.

By indicating the ways in which a historically entrenched form of national state territoriality is being superseded, deterritorialization researchers have made an important contribution to the project of theorizing social space in an explicitly historical manner. However, because they recognize the historicity of territoriality primarily in terms of its disappearance, obsolescence, or demise, deterritorialization approaches cannot analyze the types of qualitative

reconfigurations and rescalings of territoriality that have been briefly outlined above. Even if the role of the national scale as an autocentric territorial container has been unsettled, national states continue to play a key role in producing the geographical infrastructures upon which the process of capital circulation depends and in regulating political-economic life at all spatial scales. The reterritorialization and rescaling of inherited, nationally organized institutional forms and policy relays represents an important political strategy through which national states are attempting to adjust to, and to (re)assert control over, a rapidly changing geoeconomic context. Figure 2.6 provides a schematic summary of the preceding critique of deterritorialization approaches to globalization studies.

Conclusion: rethinking the geographies of globalization

Like the forms of state-centrism that have dominated the social sciences for much of the last century, the methodological opposition between global territorialist and deterritorialization approaches to globalization studies can be viewed as a real abstraction of contemporary social practices. Throughout this discussion, I have argued that each of these approaches grasps real dimensions of contemporary social reality, albeit in a truncated, one-sided manner. As noted, capital has long presupposed a moment of territorial fixity or place-boundedness as a basic prerequisite for its ever-expanding circulation process. Whereas state-centric epistemologies fetishize this territorialist moment of capitalism, deterritorialization approaches embrace an inverse position, in which territoriality is said to erode or disappear as globalization intensifies. The bifurcation of contemporary globalization studies into these opposed methodological approaches reflects these contradictory aspects of contemporary sociospatial transformations without critically explaining them.

The alternative theorization of global restructuring introduced in this chapter suggests that deterritorialization and reterritorialization are mutually constitutive, if highly conflictual, moments of an ongoing dialectic through which political-economic space is continually produced, reconfigured, and transformed under capitalism. Thus conceived, the contemporary round of global restructuring has entailed neither the absolute territorialization of societies, economies, or cultures onto a global scale, nor their complete deterritorialization into a supraterritorial, distanceless, placeless, or borderless space of flows. What is occurring, rather, is a multiscalar restructuring of capitalist sociospatial configurations, coupled with a reshuffling of entrenched hierarchies of scalar organization, leading in turn to qualitatively new geographies of capital accumulation, state regulation, and uneven development. In my view, a crucial challenge for future research on the geographies of global capitalism is

Main features	Territoriality is said to be declining, eroding, or disappearing as placeless, distanceless, and supraterritorial geographies of networks and flows proliferate throughout the world system Consequently: the capacity of national states to regulate their territorial jurisdictions is said to be weakening or eroding
Prominent examples	• Appadurai's (1996) theory of global cultural flows • Castells's (1996) theory of the 'space of flows' • Hardt and Negri's (2001) concept of 'Empire' • Jameson (1992) on 'postmodern hyperspace' • Ohmae's (1990, 1995) notion of the 'borderless world' • O'Brien's (1991) conception of the 'end of geography' • Ruggie's (1993) analysis of the EU as a 'nonterritorial region' • Scholte's (2000) theory of 'supraterritoriality' (but he explicitly rejects the thesis of state decline)
Major accomplishments	In contrast to methodologically territorialist approaches, the historicity and potential malleability of territoriality are emphasized Introduces alternative geographical categories for describing currently emergent spatial forms that do not presuppose their enclosure within territorially bounded geographical spaces
Problems and limitations	The historicity of territoriality is reduced to an either/or choice between two options, its presence or its absence; thus the possibility that territoriality is being reconfigured, reterritorialized, and rescaled rather than being eroded cannot be adequately explored The relation between global space and national territoriality is viewed as a zero-sum game in which the growing importance of the former necessarily entails the decline of the latter; consequently, the role of subglobal transformations (for instance, of national states, regions, and cities) in processes of global restructuring cannot be examined Brackets the various forms of spatial fixity, embedding, and (re)territorialization—particularly at national, regional, and local scales—upon which global flows are necessarily premised

Fig 2.6. The epistemology of deterritorialization approaches: schematic overview

to develop an epistemology of social space that can critically grasp these processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization as intrinsically related dimensions of contemporary sociospatial transformations, as well as their variegated, path-dependent consequences in specific political-economic

contexts. This chapter has attempted to outline some methodological foundations for confronting this task.

At the most general level, I have suggested that the contemporary round of global capitalist restructuring has destabilized the entrenched, nation state-centric geographical assumptions that have underpinned the social sciences throughout most of the twentieth century. It is for this reason, I believe, that contemporary debates on globalization have induced many scholars to develop more reflexive, dynamic, and historically specific understandings of social spatiality. The preceding discussion of these debates underscores four particularly crucial methodological challenges for contemporary studies of global sociospatial restructuring.

1. *The historicity of social space*. The contemporary round of global restructuring has put into relief the distinctive, historically specific character of national state territoriality as a form of sociospatial organization. As the primacy of national state territoriality has been decentered and relativized, the historical, and therefore malleable, character of inherited formations of political-economic space has become dramatically evident both in sociological analysis and in everyday life. The overarching methodological challenge that flows from this circumstance is to analyze social spatiality, at all scales, as an ongoing historical *process* in which the geographies of social relations are continually molded, reconfigured, and transformed (Lefebvre 1991).

2. *Polymorphic geographies*. National state territoriality is today being intertwined with, and superimposed upon, an immense variety of emergent sociospatial forms—from the supranational institutional structures of the EU to global financial flows, new forms of transnational corporate organization, post-Fordist patterns of industrial agglomeration, global interurban networks, and transnational diasporic communities—that cannot be described adequately as contiguous, mutually exclusive, and self-enclosed blocks of territorial space. Under these circumstances, the image of political-economic space as a complex, tangled mosaic of superimposed and interpenetrating nodes, levels, scales, and morphologies has become more appropriate than the traditional Cartesian model of homogenous, self-enclosed and contiguous blocks of territory that has long been used to describe the modern interstate system (Lefebvre 1991: 87–8). New representations of sociospatial form are urgently needed in order to analyze these newly emergent polymorphic, polycentric, and multiscalar geographies of global social change.[30] A crucial methodological challenge for contemporary sociospatial research is therefore to analyze newly emergent geographies in ways that transcend the conventional imperative to choose between purely territorialist and deterritorialized mappings of political-economic space.

[30] For important recent inroads into this task, see A. Amin 2002; Dicken et al. 2001; Graham 1997; Graham and Marvin 2001; Larner and Walters 2002; Leitner 2004; and Sheppard 2002.

3. *The new political economy of scale*. The current round of global restructuring has significantly decentered the national scale of political-economic life and intensified the importance of both subnational and supranational scales of sociospatial organization. These transformations undermine inherited conceptions of geographical scale as a static, fixed, and nested hierarchy and reveal its socially produced, historically variegated, and politically contested character. From this perspective, geographical scales must be viewed not only as the products of political-economic processes, but also as their presupposition and their medium (Smith 1995). Scalar arrangements are thus never fixed in stone but evolve continuously in conjunction with the dynamics of capital accumulation, state regulation, social reproduction, and sociopolitical struggle. Under these conditions, a key methodological challenge is to conceptualize geographical scales at once as an institutional scaffolding within which the dialectic of deterritorialization and reterritorialization unfolds and as an incessantly changing medium and outcome of that dialectic (Brenner 1998*a*).

4. *The remaking of state space*. Finally, this discussion has emphasized the key role of national states in promoting and mediating contemporary sociospatial transformations, and concomitantly, the ways in which national states have in turn been reorganized—functionally, institutionally, and geographically—in conjunction with this role. Contemporary state institutions are being significantly rescaled at once upwards, downwards, and outwards to create qualitatively new, polymorphic, plurilateral institutional geographies that no longer overlap evenly with one another, converge upon a single, dominant geographical scale or constitute a single, nested organizational hierarchy. These developments undermine traditional, Westphalian models of statehood as an unchanging, self-enclosed national-territorial container and suggest that more complex, polymorphic, and multiscalar regulatory geographies are emerging than previously existed. Under these conditions, an important methodological challenge is to develop a spatially attuned and scale-sensitive approach to state theory that can grasp not only the variegated regulatory geographies associated with inherited, nationalized formations of political space, but also the profoundly uneven reterritorializations and rescalings of statehood that are currently unfolding throughout the world system.

Subsequent chapters of this book confront the aforementioned methodological challenges in the context of a postdisciplinary investigation of political-economic, institutional, and sociospatial change in contemporary western Europe. These challenges are complementary insofar as addressing any one of them also opens up new methodological and empirical perspectives through which to confront the others. However, given my overarching concern in this book with transformations of state space, it is the fourth methodological challenge that occupies center stage in subsequent chapters. I shall thus grapple with each of the first three methodological challenges through a more direct confrontation with the task of deciphering contemporary pro-

cesses of state spatial restructuring. Accordingly, building upon the approach to sociospatial theory introduced above, the next chapter elaborates the theoretical foundations for a spatialized, scale-sensitive approach to state theory.